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Moore: One Less Juror

ONE LESS JUROR: A DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO JUROR
SUBSTITUTION
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. McDuffie1
(decided May 8, 2012)

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Recently, the Appellate Division, Second Department reviewed People v. McDuffie2 to determine whether defendant had
properly submitted a jury substitution waiver, and thus, properly
waived his right to a jury trial.3
In McDuffie, defendant was brought up on charges of seconddegree murder and criminal possession of a weapon.4 One day after
deliberations began, Juror Number One declined to continue serving
on the jury.5 Consequently, the court allowed defendant and his attorney to confer about whether to substitute one of the alternate jurors
for Juror Number One, while the court proceeded with another case.6
When defendant’s case reconvened, the court signed the juror substitution form previously signed by defendant, without first speaking
with him.7 The alternate juror was then seated and deliberations continued.8 Shortly after, the jury reached a verdict of guilty. 9 Defendant subsequently appealed the decision, claiming that the juror substi-

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

943 N.Y.S.2d 594 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
Id.
Id.
McDuffie, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 594, 595.
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tution was invalid.10
After reviewing the record before it, the appellate court concluded that the juror substitution was invalid and ordered a new trial.11 The court found that defendant’s “election,” allowing substitution of the juror, had not been completed according to the New York
State Constitution or Criminal Procedure Law section 270.35.12 The
court based its decision on the fact that the record had neither indicated that the consent form was signed in “open court” nor that the court
had conducted a colloquy to ensure that defendant was making a
knowing and understanding waiver.13
One of the bases for the appellate court’s ruling was the decision in People v. Teatom,14 which was decided only a few months
prior to McDuffie. In Teatom, defendant was charged with driving
while intoxicated and other traffic infractions, after he drove his vehicle off the road and struck a telephone pole.15 Defendant was later
convicted following a jury trial, and subsequently, appealed the conviction.16 One of the grounds for the appeal was that the trial court
had failed to comply with Criminal Procedure Law section 270.35.17
The appellate court agreed with defendant, reversed the trial court’s
decision, and ordered a new trial.18 The court arrived at its decision
despite the fact that the juror had been discharged upon defendant’s
request.19
The appellate court observed that the trial court had not obtained a signed consent from defendant until the day after the juror
had been substituted.20 Rather, the trial court had allowed the deliberations of the previous day to continue after discharging the original
juror, substituting the alternate, and only directing the jury to restart
the deliberation process.21 Further, the court found that the record
10

Id. at 595.
McDuffie, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 595, 596.
12
Id. at 595.
13
Id.
14
936 N.Y.S.2d 379 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012).
15
Id. at 380.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 381. Defendant also appealed his conviction on the ground that the conviction for
driving while intoxicated was not properly supported by evidence of his intoxication because
he had only become intoxicated after the accident, which bore no witnesses. Id. at 380.
18
Teatom, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
11
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had not indicated that the consent form was signed in open court.22
The court deemed this a violation of “defendant’s fundamental right
to a trial by a jury of 12.”23
In order to fully understand the issue of juror substitution, it is
necessary to explore the history of a criminal defendant’s right to trial
by a jury. The two concepts are inextricably linked because a defendant’s right to juror substitution emerged as a result of the need to
protect a defendant’s right to a jury trial. This Note will explore the
history of a criminal defendant’s right to trial by jury and its nexus
with the juror substitution process.
II.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

Under federal law, a defendant’s right to a jury trial is enumerated in Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the United States Constitution.24 The provision provides:
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in
the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the
trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress
may by law have directed.25
Prior to being codified in the United States Constitution, the
right to trial by jury had been in existence in England and linked to
credible sources, such as the Magna Carta.26 Its function of protecting defendants against arbitrary rulings was set out in the Declaration
and Bill of Rights of 1689 as an important objective of the “revolutionary settlement.”27 The declaration “[t]hat trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these colonies,”
was “adopted by the First Congress of the American Colonies (the
Stamp Act Congress) on October 19, 1765.”28 The authors of the
22

Id.
Teatom, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
24
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (suggesting that the right to trial by jury was included in the federal Constitution because defendants in the colonies were being tried by judges controlled by the King, and in some cases,
being sent back to England to be tried for offenses that occurred in the Colonies).
25
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
26
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 152.
23
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declaration considered it one of the most important of the rights and
liberties possessed by the colonists.29 Thereafter, the importance of
the right to trial by jury was re-established by the proposition and
adoption of the Sixth Amendment within the Bill of Rights. 30 It provided in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”31
Along with the Sixth Amendment, Rules 23 and 24 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were enacted to clarify the
boundaries of the right to a jury trial. Rule 23(a) provides that if a
defendant is entitled to a jury trial, waiver can be achieved, but only
if it is in writing, the government consents, and it is approved by the
court.32 Rule 23(b) provides that even though a jury consists of
twelve individuals, at any time prior to a verdict, the parties can agree
and stipulate in writing to a jury of less than twelve individuals, or alternatively, that the court may allow fewer than twelve jurors to return a verdict upon finding good cause to excuse a juror after the beginning of deliberations.33 The rule further provides that “[a]fter the
jury has retired to deliberate, the court may permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, even without a stipulation by the parties, if
the court finds good cause to excuse a juror.”34 Rule 24 (c) provides
that the court may retain alternate jurors after deliberations have
commenced in the event that a juror needs to be replaced. 35 However, the rule further provides that “[t]he court must ensure that a retained alternate does not discuss the case with anyone until that alternate replaces a juror or is discharged. If an alternate replaces a juror
29

Id.
Id. at 153. See Sanjay Chhablani, DISENTANGLING THE S IXTH AMENDMENT, 11 U.
P A. J. CONST. L. 487 (2009). The author points out that the Supreme Court has incorporated the provisions of the Sixth Amendment into the rights guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus, provides defendants being tried in state
courts with the same procedural safeguards as defendants being tried in the federal courts.
Id. at 494. However, two of the Sixth Amendment provisions were not incorporated to apply
in the same respect to state courts. Id. at 549 n.24. The first is that even though unanimity is
required for a jury verdict in federal courts it is not required in state court. Id. Second, even
though a twelve-member jury is required in federal court a jury of less than this amount is
proper in state courts. Id.
31
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
32
F ED. R. CRIM . P. 23(a).
33
F ED. R. CRIM . P. 23(b).
34
Id.
35
F ED. R. CRIM . P. 24(c).
30
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after deliberations have begun, the court must instruct the jury to
begin its deliberations anew.”36
A.

United States Supreme Court Cases

One of the seminal cases in which the United States Supreme
Court dealt with a defendant’s right to substitute a juror was Patton v.
United States.37 In Patton, defendants were brought up on charges of
bribing a “federal prohibition agent.”38 The charge carried a sentence
of one year in a federal penitentiary.39 A jury of twelve individuals
was assembled and the trial began.40 It continued for approximately
seven days until one of the jurors became ill and was unable to continue.41
As a result, the prosecutor and defense counsel, with defendant’s consent, stipulated in court that the trial be allowed to continue
with the eleven remaining jurors.42 Thereafter, the court consented to
the stipulation, stating that: (1) both parties were entitled to a twelvemember jury; and (2) a mistrial had to be declared unless they were
willing to waive any objections and agree to resolve the matter with
the remaining eleven member jury.43 After the court’s statement, all
the parties renewed the earlier stipulation.44 Defense counsel then
stated that after conferring with the defendants and all of the counselors, they all wished to continue the trial with the remaining eleven
jurors, as long as the defendants were able to waive the “presence of
the twelfth juror.”45 The trial continued with the eleven jurors and
ended the next day with the conviction of the defendants for the
charged crimes.46
The defendants subsequently appealed their convictions to the
circuit court, claiming that they did not have the authority to waive

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id.
281 U.S. 276 (1930).
Id. at 286.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Patton, 281 U.S. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 287.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 26

1518

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

their constitutional right to a jury consisting of twelve individuals.47
The court of appeals, in turn, certified the question to the United
States Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Constitution,
if a federal trial has begun with a twelve member jury and a juror later becomes “incapacitated” and unable to carry out his/her duties, the
parties can choose to have the remaining eleven jurors proceed and
render a verdict, thus waiving the right to a trial and verdict by a
twelve member jury pool.48
In arriving at its decision, the Court first examined the meaning of “trial by jury.”49 The Court interpreted it to be inclusive of all
the “essential elements” in America and England when the Constitution was ratified and through its existence at common law.50 The
court determined that “jury” meant a panel consisting of “twelve
men, neither more nor less.”51 The Court declared that there was no
distinct difference between the right to completely waive a jury trial
and the right to consent to a verdict by less than twelve jurors, and
thus, concluded that they should be treated the same.52
However, in arriving at its decision, the court interpreted the
constitutional provision as a privilege extended to the accused, and
thus, a right that he may “forego at his election.”53 The Court cautioned that denying a defendant the right to waive the privilege would
in essence turn the right into an overbearing requirement.54 In holding that a defendant possesses the right to waive trial by a jury or to
consent to a verdict by less than twelve jurors, the Court cautioned
that though a defendant possessed the right, it did not mean that it
should be instituted in all circumstances.55 The court explained that
trial by jury is the “normal” and “preferable” way of disposing of a
criminal matter for a non-petty offense, and thus, should not be second-guessed.56 The court established that in order for there to be a
constitutional waiver, defendant’s “express and intelligent consent,”
the consent of the prosecuting attorney, and the approval of the court
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Patton, 281 U.S. at 287.
Id.
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id.
Patton, 281 U.S. at 290.
Id. at 296, 298.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 312.
Id.
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must be acquired.57 Furthermore, the court cautioned that courts
must use “sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial,” and increase the
level of caution according to the degree of the offense.58
Later in Duncan v. Louisiana,59 the Supreme Court held that
all criminal cases that would have fallen within the purview of the
Sixth Amendment, had they been tried in federal court, were guaranteed the right to trial by a jury.60 In Duncan, defendant was originally
tried in a district court in the state of Louisiana.61 According to the
facts, defendant was driving on a highway when he noticed two of his
younger cousins, who were negroes, talking to four other white
boys.62 Defendant, knowing of recent racial tensions at his cousins’
school, pulled over, spoke to the white boys and encouraged his cousins to get into his car and leave.63 The parties presented differing stories as to the series of events that followed.64 The white boys stated
that defendant hit one of them while the negroes stated that defendant
had only touched the boy.65 The trial judge subsequently found defendant guilty of simple battery, sentenced him to sixty days in parish
prison and imposed a one hundred and fifty dollar fine.66
Under Louisiana law, the conviction carried a maximum sentence of two years and a fine of three hundred dollars.67 Defendant
originally sought a jury trial, but his request was denied because Louisiana only allowed jury trials in death penalty cases or cases that carried a sentence of “imprisonment at hard labor.”68 Defendant appealed his conviction to the Louisiana Supreme Court, arguing that
the denial of his right to a jury trial violated his constitutional right.69
The Louisiana court denied defendant’s writ, finding no error in the
law.70 Defendant subsequently appealed to the United States Su57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Patton, 281 U.S. at 312.
Id. at 312-13.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 146, 147.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146.
Id.
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preme Court, claiming Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment violations
of the right to trial by a jury in a state case where the charged crime
carried a sentence of up two years.71
The Supreme Court held that defendant was entitled to a jury
trial, and thus, the court erred when it failed to provide it to defendant.72 The Court, in forming its decision, explained that the right to a
jury trial is extended to defendants in criminal matters to prevent
“oppression by the government.”73 The Court stated that the framers
of the Constitution included the right to a jury trial in order to guard
citizens against arbitrary governmental actions.74 The Court further
observed that a defendant’s right to be tried by his peers is a necessary safeguard against the “overzealous prosecutor” and a “compliant, biased or eccentric judge.”75 The Court expressed that crimes
bearing sentences of up to six months did not require a trial by jury if
they are petty offenses in every sense.76
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court faced a similar issue in
Williams v. Florida.77 In Williams, defendant was brought up on
robbery charges in Florida state court.78 Prior to trial, he filed a motion requesting a jury of twelve instead of the six-juror requirement
under Florida law in cases other than capital cases.79 The motion was
denied and defendant was convicted and given a life sentence.80 The
Court needed to answer the question of whether the Constitution
guaranteed a defendant the right to trial by a jury of twelve members,
as opposed to a lesser amount.81
In Williams, the Court rejected the premise in Patton that the
authors of the Constitution intended that a constitutional jury must
include the exact characteristics of the common law jury.82 The
Court found it more fitting to inquire into the function of the jury and

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 155.
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
Id.
Id. at 159.
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 86.
Williams, 399 U.S. at 99.
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its importance to the purpose of the trial.83 Based on its analysis, the
Court concluded that the twelve-member requirement was not an “indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment.”84 The Court emphasized that the inherent protection afforded by a jury derives from
its role in providing the “commonsense judgment” of a group of average citizens, and “the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence.”85
Further, the Court pointed out that it was not the size of the
group that provided the benefit; it was the fact that the group was big
enough to foster deliberation free from outside intimidation and
“provide a fair possibility” of getting representatives from a “crosssection of the community.”86 The Court further stated that it did not
find this result any less likely with a group of six jurors, and accordingly, ruled that defendant’s right to trial by a jury was not violated
when Florida provided a jury of six individuals instead of twelve.87
B.

Second Circuit Cases

One of the main cases in the Second Circuit dealing with juror
substitution is United States v. Hillard.88 Hillard was the Second
Circuit’s first discussion of the implications of Rule 24(c) on the substitution of jurors.89 The case involved defendants who were appealing their convictions from charges related to a heroin operation.90
One of the issues raised on appeal was that an improper juror
substitution had taken place after the case was submitted to the jury.91
A juror had been substituted for an original juror who had fallen ill
after two and-a-half days of deliberations and a three-day holiday
break.92 The juror was substituted after the judge discussed different
possibilities with counsel and defendants refused to stipulate to an

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id.
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100, 103.
701 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1054.
Id.
Id. at 1054-55.
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eleven-member jury or a one-day adjournment.93 As a result, the
judge proceeded with the juror substitution after he decided that further delay of the deliberations would lead to a negative result.94 The
court found that the substitute juror who had been asked to remain after the case was submitted to the jury was kept separate and only accompanied the jury when it went to the courtroom to listen to testimony or to re-read or get additional jury instructions.95
The court in Hillard dealt with an asserted challenge to Rule
24(c), that any substitution of a juror after the beginning of deliberations was a violation of the rule, and as such, required reversal.96
Rule 24(c), at the time, only provided for the replacement of jurors
“prior to the time the jury retire[d] to consider its verdict” and required discharge of alternates “after the jury retire[d] to consider its
verdict.”97 Though the court agreed with defendant’s view that the
rule limited the substitution of jurors to the pre-deliberation stage, it
disagreed that a violation of the rule required per se reversal of a verdict.98 The court ruled in accord with the Fifth Circuit, that absent
prejudice to a defendant, a violation of Rule 24(c) did not implicate
per se reversal of a verdict.99 The court, thereafter, found that there
was no prejudice to defendant because the substitute juror did not influence the deliberations by the twelve original jurors because he was
kept separate until the substitution took place; and further, the juror
had stated that he was not swayed by his discussions with another alternate juror.100 The court also cautioned that absent “a change in the
rule, juror substitution should be permitted only in complex cases
where thorough precautions are taken to ensure that the defendants
are not prejudiced.”101
In arriving at its decision, the court also considered whether
the substitution procedure outlined in Rule 24(c) was consistent with
the features of the jury that were essential to its operation.102 The
court found that Rule 24(c) was indeed consistent with the essential
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1057.
Id.
Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1057-58.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1056.
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feature of the jury.103 Based on this finding, the court concluded that
the substitution by the court was proper because: (1) the alternate was
chosen at the same time and through the same procedure as the other
jurors; (2) he heard all the same evidence and instructions as the original jurors; and (3) the replacement juror re-affirmed that he would be
able to “consider the evidence and deliberate fairly and fully” and
stipulated that his discussion of the case with the second alternate had
not impacted his opinion of the case.104 The court also found it persuasive that the judge had instructed the jury to start the deliberation
process anew after the substitution.105
In a more recent case, United States v. Carmenate,106 the Second Circuit dealt with a challenge to a waiver under Rule 23(a) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.107 There, the court emphasized the importance of creating a record evidencing a jury waiver
that is inclusive of a formal questioning or colloquy of the defendant
(even though it is not required for a constitutional waiver of the right
to trial by a jury).108
In Carmenate, defendant was convicted of bank fraud in a
bench trial.109 Defendant appealed the conviction claiming that the
trial court violated his constitutional right to trial by jury. 110 Defendant’s claim on appeal arose from the fact that, during a pre-trial conference, he informed the court that he wished to have a bench trial in
order to avoid having an employee of the bank he was accused of defrauding, testify against him in front of a jury.111 The prosecution
consented to the bench trial and the court requested a written waiver
at the final pre-trial conference.112 Defendant later claimed that his
constitutional right was violated because: (1) he did not sign a written
waiver in accordance with Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (2) his oral consent to the waiver was not “knowing, voluntary, or intelligent,” because it did not apprise him of the

103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Hillard, 701 F.2d at 1056.
Id. at 1056-57.
Id. at 1057.
544 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carmenate, 544 F.3d at 106.
Id.
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scope of the right and the repercussions of his waiver.113
However, the court disagreed with defendant and held that his
waiver was indeed “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”114 The
court arrived at its decision by evaluating the three requirements of
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures. 115 Specifically, the rule requires that to waive a jury trial: (1) the defendant
must put the waiver in writing; (2) the government must give its consent; and (3) the court must approve the waiver.116 The court restated
its previous recommendation that prior to granting a waiver, a court
should inform the defendant of the importance of a jury trial and of
the process of selecting the jury; and also, that if the defendant
waives the right to a jury trial, the judge will be the sole decision
maker in the case.117 However, the court explained that the recommendations were merely suggestions and not required for a constitutional waiver.118
Subsequently, the court went on to explain that a court must
evaluate all the circumstances of the case prior to granting a defendant’s waiver.119 The court further explained, however, that even
though these steps were not taken in defendant’s case, the flaw was
not fatal.120 The court concluded that defendant’s waiver was indeed
valid because defendant: (1) was present at the original pre-trial conference where his attorney informed the court of his wish to proceed
with the bench trial; (2) was also present at the final pre-trial conference where his written consent was obtained; and (3) the court reviewed defendant’s request at the beginning of the bench trial and
questioned defendant about his decision.121
Defendant also argued that the waiver presented to the court
was invalid because it had been signed by his counselor and not by
him.122 With regard to this argument, the court agreed with the First,
Fourth, and Tenth Circuits and rejected the notion that this was re-

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Carmenate, 544 F.3d at 107.
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 108.
Id.
Id. at 108.
Carmenate, 544 F.3d at 108.
Id. at 109.
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versible error.123 The court concluded that while Rule 23(a) seemed
to require a defendant’s signature on the written waiver, the absence
of defendant’s signature was not reversible error as long as the defendant’s waiver is otherwise “knowing, voluntary and intelligent.”124
Here, the court concluded that “defendant’s waiver was knowing,
voluntary and intelligent.”125
III.

HISTORY OF NEW YORK’S RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

The right to trial by jury in New York State was first set out in
the original Charter of Liberties and Privileges in 1683, which was
ratified by the first legislature.126 The right was also recognized by
New York in its first constitution after it became a state.127 Article I,
Section 2 of the New York Constitution, guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial as it existed at common law.128 This
implied a jury of twelve members, because at common law a jury was
comprised of twelve individuals.129 Originally, this right was considered so fundamental that no party was allowed to waive it.130 A defendant was precluded from waiver even in instances where the defendant explicitly requested and consented to be tried by a jury of less
than twelve jurors.131 In 1846, an amendment to the constitution was
passed which provided for waiver of the right to trial by jury in civil
actions.132 This amendment allowed a defendant in a civil case to
waive the right to trial by jury, thereby allowing trial by a single
judge or trial by a jury of less than twelve members.133 This would
later impact waivers of trial by jury in the criminal arena.
In 1858, the Court of Appeals decided Cancemi v. People.134
In Cancemi, an eleven-member jury convicted defendant of murder.135 Defendant, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney consent123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d 863, 865 (N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 865.
People v. Page, 665 N.E.2d 1041, 1043 (N.Y. 1996).
Id. at 1043.
Id.
Id.
Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 865-66.
18 N.Y. 128 (1858).
Id. at 130-31.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 26

1526

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

ed to the dismissal of the twelfth juror after the jurors were impanelled and the trial had begun.136 Defendant subsequently appealed his
conviction claiming that the judgment should be reversed because he
was tried by a jury of only eleven members, a panel not recognized at
common law, and thus, unconstitutional.137 The court agreed, and
held that a withdrawal of one juror rendered the verdict unconstitutional.138 The court reasoned that the constitution and laws required a
twelve member jury when a case is brought out of an indictment, and
thus, neither a defendant nor a prosecuting attorney were in a position
to consent to any change in the number.139
Post-Cancemi, New York courts continued to adhere to the
twelve-juror requirement for a constitutional trial. However, in 1935
the Judicial Counsel sought legislative amendment to the constitution.140 It proposed the establishment of a “concurrent resolution” in
the constitution providing for waiver of a jury trial for criminal defendants who were not being charged with capital offenses.141 The
resolution was passed in 1937, ratified by voters and became effective January 1, 1938.142 The amendment provided that waiver of a jury trial may be accomplished in a manner to be determined by law,
except in cases where a defendant was charged with a crime that carries as its punishment, death.143 Later that same year, the constitution
was again amended to include the express provision that waiver of a
trial by jury was to be made in writing, signed by defendant in open
court, and with approval from the presiding judge or justice. 144 Since
1938, the State constitution has not been modified and currently provides that
[t]rial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore
been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever; but a jury trial may be waived
by the parties in all civil cases in the manner to be pre136

Id. at 129, 130-31.
Id. at 131.
138
Id. at 138.
139
Cancemi, 18 N.Y. at 138.
140
Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 866.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Page, 665 N.E.2d at 1043.
144
Id.; see also Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 866-67 (stating that in 1938 an amendment was
made to Article I, Section 2, inserting language that specified the procedure for waiver of a
jury trial).
137
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scribed by law. The legislature may provide, however, by law, that a verdict may be rendered by not less
than five-sixths of the jury in any civil case. A jury
trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal
cases, except those in which the crime charged may be
punishable by death, by a written instrument signed by
the defendant in person in open court before and with
the approval of a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense.145
In 1963, the Court of Appeals in People v. Duchin146 established that a defendant had the right to waive his constitutionally protected right to trial by jury.147 The court declared that the right to a
jury trial is designed to benefit the defendant, and thus, when a defendant chooses to waive the right and be tried by a judge, he is entitled to such a waiver.148 However, the court announced that this
could only be accomplished if such waiver is made to the satisfaction
of the presiding judge, it is clear that the waiver is being executed in
good faith—not used to gain an unfair advantage—and the defendant
is found to be aware of the repercussions of the decision.149
A few years later, the Court of Appeals in People v. Ryan150
dealt with the issue of juror substitution after the beginning of jury
deliberations.151 In Ryan, defendants were convicted of first-degree
robbery and second-degree assault after an alternate juror was substituted for an original juror who had become ill five hours into jury deliberations.152 Defendants subsequently challenged their convictions
arguing that the alternative juror had been unconstitutionally substituted.153
In Ryan, the Court of Appeals distinguished between predeliberation substitutions and substitutions occurring after deliberations had begun.154 The court recognized that the case before it,
which involved substitution of a juror after deliberations had begun,
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
190 N.E.2d 17 (N.Y. 1963).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
224 N.E.2d 710 (N.Y. 1966).
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 712.
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was one of first impression.155 The court observed that prior to a
1952 amendment of section 358-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
the procedural rule at issue, substitutions were only allowed during
the pre-deliberation stage because alternate jurors were dismissed
once the case was turned over to the jury.156 The court further observed that after the amendment, section 358-a provided that:
[a]fter final submission of a case, the court may discharge the alternate jurors, or if the court deem it advisable he may direct that one or more of the alternate
jurors be kept in the custody of the sheriff or one or
more court officers, separate and apart from the regular jurors until the jury have agreed upon a verdict. If
after the final submission of the case and before the jury have agreed upon a verdict, a juror die or become
ill, or for any other reason he be unable to perform his
duty, the court may order him to be discharged and
draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take the
place of the discharged juror in the jury room and the
jury shall then renew its deliberations with the alternate juror, who shall be subject to the same rules and
regulations as though he had been selected as one of
the original jurors.157
Even though this provision authorized juror substitution after
a case has been submitted to the jury, the Court of Appeals concluded
that this procedure was not permissible under the New York State
Constitution.158 However, instead of finding section 358-a unconstitutional, the court merely nullified the jury’s verdict and ordered a
new trial under Article I, Section 2 of the New York State Constitution.159 Specifically, the court interpreted the New York State Constitution as recognizing a complete waiver of the right to a jury trial by
a writing signed by defendant in open court and with the judge’s approval.160 As a result, the court held that consent solely by defense
counsel did not amount to a constitutional waiver of the right to trial
155

Ryan, 224 N.E.2d at 712.
Id. at 711.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 713. The court believed it would allow a decision by thirteen jurors instead of
the constitutionally required twelve. Id.
159
Ryan, 224 N.E.2d at 713.
160
Id.
156
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by jury because the defendants were neither present nor consulted.161
As a result of Ryan, the Legislature adopted Criminal Procedure Law section 270.35, which is consistent with Article I, Section 2
of the New York State Constitution; it expressly authorizes the substitution of an original juror after deliberations have begun, where defendant personally consents in writing and in open court.162 Criminal
Procedure Law, section 270.35 provides that
[i]f at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and
before the rendition of its verdict, a juror is unable to
continue serving by reason of illness or other incapacity, or for any other reason is unavailable for continued
service, or the court finds, from facts unknown at the
time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly
unqualified to serve in the case or has engaged in misconduct of a substantial nature, but not warranting the
declaration of a mistrial, the court must discharge such
juror. If an alternate juror or jurors are available for
service, the court must order that the discharged juror
be replaced by the alternate juror whose name was
first drawn and called, provided, however, that if the
trial jury has begun its deliberations, the defendant
must consent to such replacement. Such consent must
be in writing and must be signed by the defendant in
person in open court in the presence of the court. If
the discharged juror was the foreperson, the court shall
designate as the new foreperson the juror whose name
was second drawn and called. If no alternate juror is
available, the court must declare a mistrial pursuant to
subdivision three of section 280.10.163
Another seminal case in New York’s history with regard to
juror substitution is People v. Page.164 In Page, the Court of Appeals
established the minimum requirements for compliance with Criminal
Procedure Law section 270.35. There, defendant was charged and
subsequently found guilty of grand larceny in the third degree and

161
162
163
164

Id. at 711, 713.
Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 867-68.
N.Y. CRIM . P ROC . LAW § 270.35 (McKinney 1999).
665 N.E.2d 1041 (N.Y. 1996).
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“unauthorized use” of a motor vehicle, after he stole a car.165 Twelve
jurors and two alternates were chosen to serve on the jury for the trial.166 During the course of the trial, an original juror was substituted
by an alternate, after he failed to attend court.167 Even though defense counsel objected to the substitution of that juror, defendant
failed to raise an issue regarding that substitution on his appeal.168
During deliberations, one of the original twelve jurors fell ill
and asked to be dismissed.169 As a result, the court conducted an extensive inquiry, determined that the juror was indeed sick and unable
to continue with the deliberations, and thus, excused him.170 In turn,
defense counsel requested that the court substitute the second alternate for the sick juror due to defendant’s continued incarceration and
the previous substantial delays.171 After defense counsel’s consent
was recorded, the court directly questioned defendant as to whether
he consented to the substitution and whether he had discussed it sufficiently with counsel.172 Upon defendant’s verbal affirmative response, but without written consent, the court substituted the juror
and instructed the jury to start deliberations anew.173 The jury recommenced deliberations and the next morning agreed on a verdict to
convict defendant.174
Defendant subsequently “moved to set aside the verdict”
based on Criminal Procedure Law, section 330.30, contending that
the court’s substitution of one of the original twelve jurors during deliberations, absent defendant’s written consent, amounted to a constitutional and statutory violation.175 The trial court denied defendant’s
motion, declaring that the purpose for the “waiver rule” would be defeated if defendant were allowed to seek substitution of a juror and
then claim that his consent was invalid.176 The appellate court, sub-

165

Id. at 1042.
Id.
167
Id. The court substituted the juror without inquiring whether the juror would be returning the following day. Id.
168
Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 1042.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 1042.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 1042-43.
176
Id. at 1043.
166
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sequently, affirmed the decision.177
Thereafter, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that his consent was deficient because it was not accompanied by
a signed writing.178 In opposition, the State argued that the statute’s
language requiring written consent for the substitution of a juror was
merely a “technicality” and not a prerequisite to compliance, as long
as the record reflected that the consent to substitution was “knowing,
intelligent and voluntary.”179 The Court of Appeals explicitly disagreed with the lower courts’ decisions, concluding that both Criminal
Procedure Law, section 270.35 and the state constitution required that
consent be obtained through a writing signed in open court “in the
presence of the court,” and thus, cannot be disregarded as a mere
technicality.180
The Court of Appeals in Page further explained that the proponents of the amendment proposed that consent be in writing in order to protect a defendant’s rights and to ensure that a defendant understood the undertaking.181 Moreover, the court recognized that the
proponents of Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35 intended the
writing requirement as a safeguard because an individual as a result
of human habit will generally think twice before signing a paper, especially when it waives one of the most important privileges a citizen
possesses.182 As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that based
on the history of constitutional waiver, the requirement that a defendant signs a written waiver is “critical” to a “knowing, intelligent and
voluntary waiver” of the right to a jury trial.183
Two years later in People v. Ortiz,184 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its ruling in Page. In Ortiz, defendant was convicted of
third-degree criminal sale and third-degree “criminal possession of a
controlled substance.”185 During trial and prior to deliberations, a jury member failed to show up in court, and when contacted, became
hostile.186 As a result, the juror was dismissed and the trial judge in177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id.
Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 1043.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
Page, 88 N.Y.2d at 1044.
705 N.E.2d 1199 (N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 1199.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 26

1532

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

quired whether the parties wished to consent to a juror substitution.187
Counsel for both parties agreed and the court further inquired with
defendant whether he wished to consent.188 Defendant responded in
the affirmative and was later convicted.189 Defendant later appealed
his conviction, claiming that his oral assent was invalid because
Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35 required a written instrument for juror substitutions, before and after deliberations began.190
In light of the principles espoused in Page and Ryan, the court held
that there were no statutory violations of Criminal Procedure Law,
section 270.35, observing that defendant’s oral consent to discharge a
jury member was valid because it occurred prior to the beginning of
deliberations.191
In People v. Jeanty,192 the court further clarified its precedent
regarding the procedural requirements for a valid juror substitution.
There, three cases were consolidated for appeal on the question of
whether the trial court properly applied Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35 in replacing original jurors with alternates.193 In
Jeanty,194 the court replaced an original juror after he was involved in
an accident and the court ascertained that he could not give a definite
time for his return.195 In People v. Jones,196 the court replaced two
jurors after they called the court and reported that they would not be
able to appear for trial that day.197 In the third case, People v.
Artis,198 the court replaced an ill juror after she stated that she was ill
and was unable to continue with the trial that day.199
The court concluded that the legislature in amending the stat187

Id.
Id.
189
Ortiz, 705 N.E.2d at 1199.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 1200.
192
727 N.E.2d 1237 (N.Y. 2000).
193
Id. at 1240.
194
688 N.Y.S.2d 607 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999). Defendant was convicted of first-degree
robbery, second-degree robbery, second-degree assault, fourth-degree criminal possession of
a weapon, and third-degree assault. Id. at 607.
195
Jeanty, 727 N.E.2d at 1240-41.
196
260 A.D.2d 647 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1999). Defendant was convicted of seconddegree murder and second degree “criminal possession of a weapon.” Id. at 647.
197
Jeanty, 727 N.E.2d at 1241.
198
694 N.Y.S.2d 5 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999). Defendant was convicted of seconddegree burglary and was sentenced as a “second felony offender.” Id. at 5.
199
Jeanty, 727 N.E.2d at 1241.
188
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ute in 1996 intended to create a bright line rule.200 The court explained that if an original juror is absent and does not appear within
two hours of the scheduled time for the resumption of a trial, and the
court has undertaken a “reasonably thorough inquiry,” the court, in its
discretion, may substitute the original juror.201 The court explained
that the amendment was made as a result of a prior decision where a
court’s substitution of an original juror after only forty-five minutes
of the original juror not appearing, was found improper.202 The court
also noted that the amendment was intended to ratify another decision
in which the court found no error was committed where the trial court
waited two hours before replacing an original juror who had not appeared for the continuance of the trial.203 The court refuted defendants’ assertions that: (1) the rule should be parsed and the requirement of a reasonable inquiry only be applied in cases where the cause
of a juror’s absence is known; and (2) that the two-hour part of the
rule should only be applied when the juror’s whereabouts are unknown.204 In rejecting this view, the court stated that the statute made
no distinction between the two scenarios.205
Further, the court explained that if the reasonable inquiry
shows that there is a likelihood that the original juror will not be appearing in two hours, the court may, in its discretion, decide to discharge the juror.206 The court also explained that the two-hour period
is “not an arbitrary cut off point,” but rather, “strikes a constitutionally acceptable balance between the need to avoid uncertainty and delay, and the defendant’s right to an orderly jury trial.” 207 The court
found that in each of the cases presented for appeal, the trial court
conducted a “reasonably thorough inquiry” and determined that the
jurors were not going to be returning within the two-hour window,
and accordingly, held that the substitutions were made in accordance
with Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35(2).208
The court’s ruling in this case, is one that, as it expressed,
built on other previous holdings regarding the validity of a juror sub200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Id. at 1240.
Id.
Id. at 1242.
Id.
Jeanty, 727 N.E.2d at 1242.
Id.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1244.
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stitution.209 This holding is justified based upon the court’s careful
balance of the countervailing interests of the defendant and the government. As the court pointed out, the two-hour rule prevents either
party from obtaining an unfair advantage based on the effect the absentee juror had on the case.210 The rule is practical because it allows
for the prompt trial of a defendant and proper expenditure of limited
judicial resources.
Recently, in People v. Gajadhar,211 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the precedent established in Page, that a defendant cannot
consent to substitution of a juror after deliberations have begun,
simply by way of oral consent.212 In Gajadhar, defendant was tried
before a twelve-juror panel and other alternate jurors.213 After the
presentation of the case, defense counsel informed the court that defendant would not seek substitution of a juror in the event that an
original juror was incapacitated, following the commencement of deliberations.214 As a result, the court dismissed the alternates pursuant
to Criminal Procedure Law, section 270.35, which provided that a
new juror may not be substituted for an original juror after deliberations had begun, without defendant’s consent.215 During deliberations, a juror fell ill and had to be hospitalized.216 Rather than face a
mistrial, defendant requested that deliberations continue with the
eleven remaining jurors.217 Defendant signed a waiver in open court,
waiving his right to trial by a twelve-member jury, and the trial court
granted defendant’s request.218
Defendant was subsequently convicted of first-degree attempted robbery and second-degree felony murder.219 Thereafter, defendant filed an appeal, claiming his waiver was invalid because the
state constitution prohibited a defendant from consenting to a jury
consisting of less than twelve jurors.220 The Court of Appeals reject209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
See supra text accompanying note 207.
880 N.E.2d 863 (N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 868.
Id. at 864.
Id.
Id.
Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 864.
Id. at 863.
Id.
Id. at 864-65.
Id. at 865.
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ed this contention, concluding that defendant’s waiver was constitutionally valid.221 The court explained that “because a noncapital
criminal defendant is free to waive a jury entirely . . . it follows that if
a juror becomes unavailable after deliberations have begun and there
are no alternates that can be substituted, a defendant should be permitted to request that an 11-member jury decide his fate.”222
IV.

CONCLUSION

The precedent established by the aforementioned cases illustrates the vital role the right to a jury trial plays in our criminal justice
system. A jury trial is not just a formalistic right, it is a privilege
guaranteed to a defendant. As such, even though this right is one that
remains fiercely protected over time, the courts recognized that procedures needed to be put in place to allow a defendant to relinquish
the right and allow a court to substitute a juror, thus, striking an appropriate balance between protecting a defendant and allowing him to
have some control over his destiny.
To accomplish this goal, a court must ensure that a defendant’s waiver complies with constitutional, as well as statutory mandates. The requirement that a defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury trial must be in writing is one that is essential to the protection of a
defendant’s right as well as one that shows the impartiality of our adversarial system. The right to a jury trial and the right to consent to a
waiver protects the defendant in whatever he or she decides is the
best strategy for a favorable resolution of the case. The requirement
that a waiver be in writing also provides significant protection to the
prosecution because it helps to preserve the defendant’s right on the
record in the event that there is a claim that there was no waiver. Also, it allows the adversarial system to run more efficiently by preventing people from later denouncing their waivers and utilizing
more judicial resources to resolve an appeal. Requiring a written
waiver preserves the consent in writing, and as both the federal and
New York State legislature wisely realized, gives the defendant a
moment to reflect on the decision being made.
It is also important to realize that there is a significant difference between pre-deliberation substitutions and substitutions occurring after deliberations have begun, as the stage at which the substitu221
222

Gajadhar, 880 N.E.2d at 863.
Id. at 869.
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tion takes place serves to define the standards to be used to ensure
that a defendant receives a fair trial. In general, courts uniformly
agree that pre-deliberation substitutions rarely pose a problem with
regard to the question of whether a defendant was tried by a jury of
twelve following such a substitution. This is because, in essence, the
substitution happens before the pivotal moment when the number of
jurors deciding the case actually has a significant impact on a defendant. However, substitutions occurring after jury deliberations have a
direct effect on the outcome of a case. Accordingly, it is sensible that
the standards for juror substitution occurring post-deliberation are
higher.
Luzan Moore*
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